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Bad Men Among the Whites Claims in the Mni
Wiconi Age
Julie Combs*
ABSTRACT
In a series of nine treaties with Native Nations in the late
1860s, the United States promised to reimburse Indigenous people for
wrongs committed by “bad men among the whites, or among other
people subject to the authority of the United States.” In the century
and half that followed the signing of these nine treaties, “bad men
among the whites” claims have been litigated in the Federal Circuit
with some success by Indigenous plaintiffs, and courts have shaped the
meaning of the clause and the remedies a successful plaintiff may
receive. This comment explores the Bad Men clause in the Mni Wiconi
– Water is Life – Age. Mni Wiconi is an Indigenous movement which
began in earnest in 2016 at the Dakota Access Pipeline protests on the
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, and seeks to address the harms done
to Indigenous peoples and their lands and waters because of extractive
industries.
This comment begins with a background of the nine treaties
that have Bad Men clauses, and surveys settled legal principles of Bad
Men litigation. Next, it explores recent Bad Men cases which have had
an impact on the scope of the clause. The comment then re-examines
an approach to judicial interpretation of the Bad Men clause first
proposed in a 2014 Harvard Law Review Student Note entitled, “A
Bad Man is Hard to Find.” Finally, the comment provides an overview
of how Indigenous peoples have invoked treaty rights post-Standing
Rock, and anticipates how the Court of Federal Claims might view Bad
Men claims related to resource extraction including disruption of
Indigenous religious practice, pollution and damage to sacred waters,
and sexual violence against Indigenous women.

*Citizen of the Cherokee Nation, J.D. (2021), University of Tulsa College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
With the advent of westward expansion, in a series of nine
treaties with Native Nations conducted under the management of
Lieutenant General William Tecumseh Sherman, the United States
sought to “remove . . . the causes of complaints on the part of the
Indians” and establish a lasting peace for the white man.1 Each of the
nine treaties contains what is known as a Bad Men clause.2 These
clauses provide that the United States will reimburse Indians for
injuries sustained as a result of wrongs committed by “bad men among
the whites, or among other people subject to the authority of the
United States.”3 Although a century and a half has passed since the
first of the nine treaties was signed, Bad Men claims remain viable
causes of action for Indians belonging to those tribes that signed
treaties with Sherman’s Great Peace Commission.4 All of the Bad Men
cases litigated thus far have involved depredations against Native
persons, despite the fact the clause states “person or property.”5
Because Bad Men claims have only been addressed in a
handful of cases over the last fifty years, the horizon for what
constitutes a “wrong” by a “bad man” against Indians or Indian
property remains fairly expansive.6 Scholarship on the clause has also
been limited. Perhaps the single greatest contribution thus far to Bad
Men scholarship is the 2014 Harvard Law Review student note, “A
Bad Man is Hard to Find.”7 As well as providing background and
context for understanding Bad Men clauses, the 2014 Note surveys
Bad Men litigation through 2014 and discusses a proposed approach
to judicial interpretation which rejects a pan-Indian superstructure,

1
N.G. TAYLOR ET AL., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE INDIAN PEACE
COMMISSION 49 (1868), http://history.furman.edu/~benson/docs/peace.htm.
2
See e.g., Treaty with the Sioux, U.S.-Sioux art. I, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635;
Treaty with the Eastern Band of Shoshoni and Bannock art. I, July 3, 1868,
15 Stat. 673; Treaty with the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho art. I,
May 10, 1868, 15 Stat. 655; Treaty with the Crows, U.S.-Crow art. I, May 7, 1868,
15 Stat. 649; Treaty with the Ute, U.S.-Ute art. VI, Mar. 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619;
Treaty with the Cheyenne and Arapaho art. I, Oct. 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 593; Treaty
with the Kiowa and Comanche art. I, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat. 581.
3
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes
of Indians, art. I, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat. 581.
4
Lillian Marquez, Note, Making “Bad Men” Pay: Recovering Pain and Suffering
Damages for Torts on Indian Reservations Under the Bad Men Clause,
20 FED. CIR. B.J. 609, 609 (2011).
5
See e.g., Treaty with the Sioux, U.S.-Sioux, art. I, Apr. 29, 1868 (emphasis added).
6
Note, A Bad Man is Hard to Find, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2511, 2522 (2014).
7
Id.
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arguing that generalizations about the Bad Men clauses fail to capture
each Native Nation’s individual interpretation.8
Since the Note’s publication, the Mni Wiconi (“Water is Life”)
Age—an age of Indigenous resistance to increased destruction by
extraction on Native lands and sacred sites—has presented Native
Nations with new challenges to sacred lands. The Bad Men clause may
be a useful tool in combatting some of the most pressing harms to
Native people and lands as a result of natural resource extraction. In
2015, Acting Chairman Kevin Wright of the Lower Brule Lakota
Sioux Tribe stated in a press release that his Tribe was invoking the
Bad Men clause against TransCanada (now TC Energy) because of
harm to tribal ancestral lands caused by the Keystone XL Pipeline
project.9 Despite the fact that no significant litigation ever came of this
invocation, treaty rights such as the Bad Men clause may be of use in
facing the new harms of the Mni Wiconi age.
Despite settled principles in the Bad Men jurisprudence, it is
unclear what effect a Bad Men claim may have against a corporate
actor such as a pipeline company or what “wrongs” the clause might
cover.10 Part I of this comment begins with a brief background of the
nine treaties, and describes settled principles from Bad Men litigation
between1967 and 2012. Next, it explores three Bad Men cases of
consequence decided after the publication of the 2014 HLR Student
Note. Part II re-examines the HLR Student Note’s proposed approach
to judicial interpretation and discusses how this method of
interpretation could prove useful to Native plaintiffs litigating harms
resulting from resource extraction on or near Native lands. Part III
discusses how the Indigenous understanding of treaty rights has
evolved post-Standing Rock and summarizes the Standing Rock
litigation. Finally, Part IV examines how, in light of its recent holdings,
the Court of Federal Claims might view Bad Men claims related to
resource extraction such as the disruption of Native religious practice,
pollution and damage to sacred waters, and sexual violence against
Native women.

8

Id. at 2530.
Emerson Urry, Lakota Sioux Tribe Invokes Bad Men Treaty Clause Over Keystone
Pipeline, TRUTHOUT (May 10, 2015), https://truthout.org/articles/lakota-sioux-tribeinvokes-bad-men-treaty-clause-over-keystone-pipeline/.
10
See generally James D. Leach, Note, Bad Men Among the Whites Claims After
Richard v. United States, 43 N.M.L. REV. 533 (2013).
9
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Origins of the Bad Men Clause and its Treatment in the
Federal Circuit
A. Background

Early English settlers in the seventeenth century first made
treaties with Native nations, and assumed that the Indigenous
population had actual ownership of the land.11 This principle of
negotiating with Native nations as sovereigns through the bargainedfor-exchange process carried over into early American treaties with
tribes.12 Formal authority for treaty-making between the United States
and tribal nations arises out of the Constitution.13 Between 1778 and
1868, over 367 treaties between tribes and the U.S. were negotiated by
the President and ratified by the Senate under Article II of the
Constitution.14
The Treaty of Hopewell, signed with the Cherokee Nation in
1785, bears early marks of a “bad men amongst the whites” clause.15
As opposed to later dealings with the Cherokee, the Treaty of
Hopewell reflected a greater U.S. interest in improving peace and trade
rather than facilitating land cessions.16 Peace and trade relations would
also serve as the impetus later on for the work of the Great Peace
Commission.17 The treaty provided that if any citizen of the
United States commits a robbery, murder, or capital crime on a
Cherokee, then they will be punished in the presence of Cherokees in
the same manner as they would have been if the crime had been
committed on a U.S. citizen.18 Though never ratified,19 the Treaty of
Hopewell represents early treaty agreements between the U.S. and

11
Arthur Spirling, U.S. Treaty Making with American Indians: Institutional Change
and Relative Power, 1784-1911, 56 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 84,
86 (2012).
12
Id.
13
It is helpful to note the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act established that only the
federal government could purchase land from Native nations. See Act of July 22,
1790, ch. 33 § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
14
See Spirling, supra note 11, at 86; see generally U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.
15
See Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.-Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18.
16
Greg O’Brien, The Conqueror Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural
Boundaries on the Revolutionary Southern Frontier, 67 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN
HISTORY 39, 47–48 (2001).
17
See generally An Act to Establish Peace with Certain Hostile Indian Tribes, ch.
32, 15 Stat. 17 (1867).
18
Treaty of Hopewell, art. VII, U.S.-Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18.
19
Not all southern states agreed to adhere to the treaty, and ultimately, the
Continental Congress failed to hold a vote on it. See O’Brien, supra note 16, at 48.
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Native nations which ensured that non-Natives who harmed Native
peoples would be turned over and punished by U.S. authorities.
In response to increased hostility between white settlers and
Native peoples in the western United States,20 Congress authorized a
Great Peace Commission on July 20, 1867 to put an end to the Indian
wars.21 The name of the Commission is somewhat deceptive—its aim
was not to negotiate peace with Native Nations, but likely to “insure”
their “civilization” and remove Native “causes of complaints” while
making “peace and safety for the whites” in the western territories.22
Irrespective of the settler-minded purpose of the Great Peace
Commission, there was no doubt that in the late 1860s, unprecedented
violence was occurring on the plains as a result of white encroachment
on Native lands.23 Ultimately, the Commission reached nine treaty
agreements with Native nations and bands, each of which contains a
Bad Men clause. The tribes that are privy to the rights of these treaties
include the Kiowa, Comanche, Apache, Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Crow,
Navajo, Northern Cheyenne, Northern Arapahoe, Ute, Eastern
Shoshone, Bannock, and tribes of the Sioux Nation.24
Each of the nine treaties contains a Bad Men clause; some are
textually identical, while others have minor differences from the
general phrasing of the clause.25 For example, in contrast with the
Sioux treaty’s less stringent language pertaining to administrative
review,26 the treaties with the Kiowa, Comanche, Cheyenne, and
Arapaho have the additional requirement that the Secretary of the

20

See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE 44–45 (1991).
An Act to Establish Peace with Certain Hostile Indian Tribes, ch. 32, 15 Stat. 17
(1867).
22
Id.
23
Kerry R. Oman, The Beginning of the End: The Indian Peace Commission of 18671868, 22 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY 35, 35–36 (2002).
24
Treaty with the Sioux, U.S.-Sioux, art. I, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635; Treaty with
the Eastern Band of Shoshoni and Bannock art. I, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673; Treaty
with the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho art. I, May 10, 1868, 15 Stat.
655; Treaty with the Crows, U.S.-Crow, art. I, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649; Treaty
with the Ute, U.S.-Ute, art. VI, Mar. 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619; Treaty with the Cheyenne
and Arapaho art. I, Oct. 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 593; Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche
art. I, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat. 581. It is worth noting that he Apache have all benefits
of the Kiowa and Comanche treaty by virtue of an incorporation clause found in their
1867 treaty. See Treaty with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache, Oct. 21, 1867, 15
Stat. 589.
25
See A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
2525-27.
26
Compare the requirements of Treaty with the Sioux, U.S.-Sioux, art. I, Apr. 29,
1868, to Treaty with the Crows, U.S.-Crow, art. I, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649, which
requires the Assistant Secretary to “thoroughly examin[e] and pas[s] upon” the
claim.
21
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Interior also examine and pass upon the claim for damages.27 It is
crucial to note that these minor differences refer only to the text of the
treaties—there are significant differences in interpretation among the
distinct Native nations, and each nation’s interpretation should be
given its own individual review in litigation, as discussed in more
detail in Part II of this comment. The commission’s final report to
President Andrew Johnson in January of 1868 reiterated the
devastating effect of white encroachment on western Native lands:
“Many bad men are found among the whites; they commit outrages
despite all social restraints; they frequently, too, escape punishment.”28
B. Bad Men Claims in the Federal Circuit, 1967-2012
(Hebah through Richard)
There are three main established issues from Bad Men case law
between 1967 and 2012: 1) dormancy of the treaties is not indicative
of the obsolescence of the Bad Men clause;29 2) Native plaintiffs must
elect the Bad Men clause as their remedy;30 and 3) government agents
qualify as “bad men among the whites.”31 Each of these “settled
issues” (as referred to in the 2014 HLR student note32 and a few others)
are crucial to understanding how a court might view a claim by a
Native plaintiff for “wrongs” of Bad Men related to the extraction of
natural resources on or near Native lands and sacred sites.
In the first few Bad Men opinions, the court determined Bad
Men claims arose from Indian treaties, which fell within the meaning
of contracts with the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1491, thus
giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over these claims.33 The first
Bad Men claim arose in 1969 when Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
policeman Norman Moss killed Robert Hebah, a Shoshone, on the
Wind River Reservation in Wyoming. His widow brought a Bad Men
claim against the United States, alleging the killing violated the 1868
treaty between the United States and the Shoshone.34 As matters of
first impression, the Court of Federal Claims addressed three
27

Treaty with the Cheyenne and Arapaho art. I, Oct. 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 593; Treaty
with the Kiowa and Comanche art. I, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat. 581.
28
TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 46.
29
See Tsosie v. United States, 825 F.2d 393, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Herrera
v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1696 (2019); United States v. Dion, 476 U. S. 734,
738–740 (1986); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
30
See Chambers v. United States, 202 Ct. Cl. 1124, 1124 (U.S. 1973).
31
Tsosie, 825 F.2d at 397; Begay v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 599, 599 (1979);
Hebah v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 787, 787 (1970).
32
A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2529.
33
See Hebah v. United States, 428 F.2d 1334, 1340 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
34
Tsosie, 825 F.2d at 393-94 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Hebah, 428 F.2d at 1335.
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questions: “(1) Was Norman Moss a bad man in the sense of the treaty?
(2) Did he commit a wrong on the person of Hebah, and if both of the
foregoing are answered in the affirmative; then, (3) What sum will
‘reimburse the injured person for the loss sustained?’”35
Hebah established a few foundational principles which “have
not been seriously challenged since.”36 First, the Court of Federal
Claims has jurisdiction over Bad Men claims.37 Second, these claims
create causes of action for individual Indians.38 Finally, though the
alleged “bad” actor was himself an Indian, that fact alone did not bar
the plaintiff from bringing a bad men claim as the officer was “subject
to the authority of the United States.”39
Nearly a decade passed between Hebah and the next significant
holding in bad men jurisprudence. In Begay v. United States, the Court
of Claims found that the Native plaintiff’s attorney failed to properly
object to the decision of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs
(AS-IA) recommending the Bad Men claims be dismissed and,
therefore, the Native plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative
remedies.40 This holding is characterized in Bad Men scholarship as a
“harsh exhaustion rule” that has never been explicitly retracted, and
which could be a cause of the “relative obscurity” of the clause.41 The
harsh exhaustion rule could pose one of the most significant hurdles to
litigating a successful bad men claim against any sort of actor, not just
against a corporate actor.
From Tsosie v. United States in 1987, through the next twenty
years, few bad men cases arose. In 2007, the Court of Claims held a
Bad Men claim under the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty could not be
broadened to incorporate claims for negligence in Garreaux v.
United States.42 There, the plaintiff was an enrolled member of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe who sought to use the treaty to recover
for damages under a lease with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development.43 The court found a “wrong” did not encompass a claim
for negligence, nor a breach of contract claim under the treaty.44
In reaching this decision, the court distinguished the “wrong”
claimed by the Lakota plaintiff from the “affirmative criminal acts,”

35

Hebah, 428 F.2d at 1335-36.
A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2530.
37
Hebah, 428 F.2d at 1335.
38
Id. at 1337–38.
39
Id. at 1340.
40
Begay v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. at 602.
41
A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2532.
42
Garreaux v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 726, 726-27 (2007).
43
Id. at 734.
44
Id. at 737.
36
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which were the alleged “wrongs” in Hebah, Tsosie, and Begay,45
despite the fact the three prior cases interpreted different treaties
(Shoshone and Navajo, respectively) than the Treaty of Fort Laramie.
Last, the factual circumstance of Garreaux (unspecified claims against
a local housing authority) indicates the type of injury courts are
“traditionally unsympathetic to.”46 This aspect could have weighed
significantly in the court’s decision not to consider breach of contract
claims in the Bad Men analysis.47 This holding is crucial to an
understanding of why a plaintiff may not be successful in a claim based
on wrongs which are common effects of the extraction industry such
as frustration of religious practice or poor hiring practices.
The first major victory for a Native plaintiff in the history of
Bad Men claims was in 2013, with Elk v. United States.48 To date, the
only plaintiff to take a Bad Men action through trial and win on the
merits is Oglala Lakota member Lavetta Elk.49 In 2003, Elk was
sexually assaulted by an Army recruiter on a secluded road on the Pine
Ridge Reservation in South Dakota.50 Looking primarily to Hebah and
Begay, the Government’s chief argument in Elk I was that Elk had
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.51 The Court of Federal
Claims found this argument uncompelling, and stated: “[I]mportantly,
those orders did not involve the Sioux Treaty, but rather the
[differently-worded] Navajo Treaty” which contained the proviso that
the AS-IA has to examine and pass on claims submitted.52 In Elk II,
the Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case on the merits and found
Elk was entitled to damages totaling over $590,000 for the actions of
the “bad man.”53 The 2009 opinion was the first time a court had the
occasion to consider the meaning of “reimburse” and “loss-sustained”
under the Fort Laramie Treaty.54 To make Lavetta Elk “whole,” the
court granted her the same damages she could have recovered in a tort
action, including pain and suffering, lost wages, medical bills, and
more.55 The Elk II decision was a turning point in Bad Men
jurisprudence, as it created a precedent for individuals to recover under

45

Id. at 736-37.
A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2533
n.93.
47
Id.
48
Elk v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 70 (2009).
49
A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2533.
50
Elk, 87 Fed. Cl. at 74.
51
Elk v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 405, 407 (2006).
52
Id. at 410.
53
Elk, 87 Fed. Cl. at 98.
54
A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2533.
55
Id.
46
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their treaty rights for wrongs against them, even if all other methods
of relief had failed.56
In 2012, the Federal Circuit again examined the effect of the
Treaty
of
Fort
Laramie’s
Bad
Men
clause
in
57
Richard v. United States. In Richard, two Oglala Lakota tribal
members were killed by a non-Indian drunk driver on the Pine Ridge
Reservation.58 On appeal, the Court of Federal Appeals held that Bad
Men claims under the Fort Laramie Treaty were not limited to
allegations against government actors, but also included “wrongs” by
non-Indian civilians.59 Of course, it is natural that the government
actors would be included. The history of the litigation suggests that
when viewing the treaties as bargained-for exchanges between two
sovereign powers, it makes sense to include federal government
employees—agents of the United States—among those who could
trigger the government’s liability by breaking the terms of the treaty.60
But the court decided that the bad men referred to in the clause are not
just these agents. The court was skeptical of the lower court’s
acceptance of the government’s characterization of the treaty’s
purpose (that the treaty was so-limited), which relied on the Doolittle
Report,61 calling the assertions “historically and factually
inaccurate.”62 The court instead looked to historical documents
produced by the Native appellants which examined the Lakota intent
at the time of signing more holistically,63 finding an intent to include
those “wholly unassociated” with the government in the Bad Men
clause.64
These cases show that early on in Bad Men cases, the
government sought to lean heavily on the argument that Bad Men
56

Marquez, supra note 4, at 624.
Richard v. United States, 677 F.3d 1141, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1149.
60
See Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit Against the
Government for American Indian Boarding School Abuses, 4 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 45, 79 (2006); see also Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
61
The Doolittle Report of 1867 was a comprehensive congressional investigation led
by Senator James Doolittle which resulted in the 500-page “Doolittle Report” that
contained damning reports of violence on the plains and fundamental disagreements
between Native nations and white settlers. See generally JOINT SPECIAL COMM.
APPOINTED UNDER JOINT RESOLUTION OF MARCH 3, 1865, CONDITIONS OF THE
INDIAN TRIBES, S. REP. NO. 39-136 (1867).
62
Richard, 677 F.3d at 1148.
63
This holding is consistent with the canons of Indian treaty construction, first issued
in Worcester v. Georgia, which will be discussed at length in Part IV. See Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
64
Richard v. United States, 677 F.3d at 1148.
57
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clauses had no effect and were “virtually dead letters” because they
were scarcely used.65 No court has ever adopted this “dormancy”
argument, as it is inconsistent with the long-held notion there must be
“‘[c]lear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict
between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on
the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty.’”66 Because courts have never found specific congressional
intent to abrogate any of the nine treaties, none of the clauses or
provisions within them can be deemed obsolete.
C.

Limited Success Post-Elk: Jones, Hernandez and
Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes (2017-2020)

i.

Jones v. United States and Hernandez v. United States

Importantly, there have been three significant Bad Men cases
in the Court of Federal Claims since the publication of “A Bad Man is
Hard to Find” in 2014. These are Jones v. United States,67 Hernandez
v. United States,68 and, most recently, Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes v.
United States.69 In 2017, in Jones, the Court of Federal Appeals
considered the validity of a Bad Men claim brought by the
representative of a deceased Ute man who was shot during a police
pursuit that ended on the Ute reservation. Jones alleged police
misconduct off the reservation as well, at sites such as the Medical
Center and mortuary, where the police allegedly covered up the onreservation killing.70 The court considered three main issues: “(1) the
nature of the cognizable wrongs, (2) the universe of applicable ‘laws
of the United States,’ and (3) the geographic location of the wrongs.”71
As to the first notable ruling, the court deferred to Tsosie in holding
that affirmative criminal acts are “cognizable” as “wrongs” under the
Navajo treaty and interpreted the Ute treaty the same.72 However, the
court noted it lacked the “historical analysis” to conclude criminal acts
of omission are not cognizable.73 Jones is an important case for a
65

See Tsosie v. United States, 825 F.2d at 396.
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202–203
(1999) (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U. S. 734, 740 (1986)), quoted in Herrera
v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1698 (2019); see also Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
67
846 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
68
141 Fed. Cl. 454 (2019).
69
No. 20-143, 2020 U.S. Claims LEXIS 2542, (Fed. Cl. Dec. 9, 2020).
70
Jones, 846 F.3d at 1343.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1358.
73
Id.
66
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second reason: the appellate court determined that the jurisdiction of a
Bad Men claim was not limited to wrongs occurring wholly on
reservation land.74 Though the court declined to issue a bright-line
standard for off-reservation claims, it held “the bad men provision may
take cognizance of off-reservations activities that are a clear
continuation of activities that took place on-reservation.”75
Two years later, the Court of Federal Claims in Hernandez
considered a Bad Men claim brought by an individual tribal citizen
against the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The plaintiff, a member of the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe, alleged that the BIA breached its fiduciary duty
towards him as a citizen of a Native nation in orchestrating
conspiracies against him.76 The court held there was nothing to suggest
a criminal conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s rights and the plaintiff
failed to state a claim under the Fort Laramie Treaty because he did
not allege a wrong consistent with the holding in Jones.77 The court
also narrowed the geographic limitations standard in Jones, now
defining the requisite “nexus” between off-reservation alleged wrongs
and on-reservation wrongs as a clear continuation of off-reservation
and on-reservation activities.78
ii.

Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes Raise Bad Men Clause
in Response to Opioid Crisis

Most recently, on December 9, 2020, the Court of Federal Claims
dismissed a suit brought by the Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes against
the United States for lack of jurisdiction where the Tribes asserted a
Bad Men claim against the government as a result of wrongful acts of
“corporate pharmaceutical opioid manufacturers, distributers, and
their agents” who caused harm to the Tribes via a “civil conspiracy”
to produce opioid addiction in individuals “within the economic
proximity of the Tribe,” including the tribal community.79 Cheyenne
& Arapaho Tribes is the first of its kind in Bad Men jurisprudence: it
is a suit brought by a tribe, not an individual, and is argued as both a
claim by a tribal government and alternatively as a parens patriae
claim on behalf of its members for off-reservation corporate wrongs
74

Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1360.
76
Hernandez v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 454, 456 (2019).
77
Id. at 462.
78
Id. (“[H]e asserts no facts that would establish a nexus between the acts of which
he complains and activities that occurred or began on the Rosebud Indian
Reservation.”).
79
Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes v. United States, No. 20-143, 2020 U.S. Claims
LEXIS 2542, at *2, 4 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 9, 2020).
75
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with “proximity” to the tribe.80 As more fully discussed in Section III,
this Bad Men case is instructive in what it teaches about how a court
might treat a claim by a tribe or group of tribal members against the
United States for the actions of a corporate actor in the extraction
industry.
The specific substance of the Cheyenne & Arapahoe Tribes’
Bad Men claim is that under the Medicine Lodge and Fort Laramie
treaties, the “Opioid Bad Men” in “reckless disregard for the
consequences, increased prescription drug marketing and sales, and
flooded the Tribe and tribal communities with prescription opioids.”81
Plaintiffs sought reimbursement under the treaty provision for losses
sustained, including the costs of medical care, welfare and foster care
for families affected by the crisis, and law enforcement costs of
policing the crisis, among other named costs.82 In its Motion to
Dismiss, the government argued three main deficiencies with the
Tribes’ Bad Men claim: (1) the clause was intended to create a cause
of action only for individuals; (2) the tribe failed to meet the procedural
requirement of exhausting administrative remedies; and (3) the tribe
did not meet the elements of a Bad Men claim83 (identification of “bad
men,” and a cognizable wrong with proximity to the reservation).84
The Court found the Tribes’ Bad Men claim unsuccessful in
part because it was unconvinced by the argument that the canons of
construction should be applied liberally to the treaties, giving the tribal
government a cause of action under the clause, and alternatively, that
the Tribes had prudential standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members under parens patriae.85 The Court held that there was no
need to apply the canons of construction where there was “no
ambiguity in the Treaties’ text” which both state “the injured person
[will be compensated] for the loss….”86 In support of this holding, the
court noted that in Hebah I, the court “was faced with interpreting an
identical ‘bad men’ clause in another tribe’s treaty” and found the
clause created a cause of action for individuals—the Cheyenne court
thus rejected the Tribes’ argument that Hebah I did not “explicitly
preclude” tribal governments from filing a Bad Men claim.87 The
Cheyenne court (perhaps because it declined to apply the canons of
80
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Id. at *10.
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See id. at *19.
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See id. at *11-14.
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Id. at *12 (quoting Treaty with the Cheyenne Indians, art. 1, Oct. 28, 1867, 15 Stat.
593 (1867) (“Medicine Lodge Treaty”); Treaty with the Cheyenne Indians, art. 1,
May 10, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 (1868) (“Fort Laramie Treaty”).
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construction) did not feel the need to explain why a different treaty
signed by a different tribe is “identical” in content and meaning to
provisions in the Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes’ treaties. Finally, the
prudential standing doctrine of parens patriae was similarly
unavailable because under precedent, the tribe did not assert a “quasisovereign interest,” but instead attempted to litigate “the rights of
individual tribe members.”88
Ultimately, apart from defects with the Tribes’ standing
arguments, the court found the plaintiff also failed to meet the elements
of a bad men claim with its argument of harm by “Opioid Bad Men”
with “economic proximity” to the tribal community.89 In walking
through the elements of the treaty claim, the court borrowed frequently
from its prior decisions in Jones and Hernandez. The court was not
persuaded by the plaintiffs’ arguments during oral argument that a Bad
Men claim based upon actions of a corporate entity was proper because
entities are under the direction of a person. Instead, the court held
under Hernandez that a corporate entity, like a court (the entity argued
by the plaintiff in Hernandez), is not cognizable as a “bad man.”90 The
court did not elaborate on the plaintiffs’ arguments because it declined
to expound upon an argument that was not included in the Tribes’
Complaint and Response.
Next, the court determined that the “wrong” alleged by the
Tribes did not meet the Jones standard of acts “prosecutable as
criminal wrongdoing” which would include on-reservation wrongs
and off-reservation wrongs that were directly connected.91 The Tribes
pointed to Purdue Pharma’s 2007 criminal and civil settlement as
evidence of a wrong that meets this standard, but the court agreed with
the government that this purported wrong did not involve the requisite
on-reservation nexus prescribed by Jones and Hernandez.92 The court
was skeptical, at best, of the Tribes’ “economic proximity”
argument—that the “Opioid Bad Men” engaged in economic activity,
purposefully exasperating the opioid crisis on and near tribal lands—
curtly stating “economic proximity of the Tribe, whatever that
means.”93 Curiously, in a footnote, the court briefly addressed an
argument by the Tribes that the wrongs of the “Opioid Bad Men” did
meet the nexus standard of Jones because on-reservation doctors overprescribed the drugs as a direct result of their actions. 94 Still, the Court
88
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again declined to engage with this argument because it was not
included in the Complaint and Response.95
The Court of Federal Claims’ decisions in Hernandez and
Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes, which leaned heavily on the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Jones, are representative of continued reluctance
by courts to accept a Bad Men claim. The three decisions all feature a
relatively new nexus-to-the-reservation requirement for these types of
claims, and each shows a continued trend in the jurisprudence of
interpreting all bad men treaties the same, even though they are
agreements between different tribes and the United States. As section
III discusses, Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes is an outlier in the Bad Men
case history because of its distinctive facts, and represents a glimpse
as to how a Bad Men claim based upon wrongs of a corporate actor in
the extraction industry might be treated in the Court of Federal Claims.
II.

Proposed Approach to Judicial Interpretation

The 2014 HLR Student Note contains a framework for judicial
interpretation of the clause which is helpful to examine in the context
of a potential claim by a Native plaintiff or plaintiffs based on wrongs
caused by resource extraction on or near Native lands.96 The proposed
approach to the interpretation of Bad Men clauses builds upon the
Indian law canons of construction. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Worcester v. Georgia expounded the fundamental rules of treaty
interpretation, foremost among them, “How the words of the treaty
were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical
meaning, should form the rule of construction.”97 Further, it is the
tribe’s perspective at the time of signing which is relevant to
interpretation. Where these canons98 have been applied, Native nations
have seen tremendous victories in federal courts,99 but where courts
have chosen to “disregard” them, it has made a significant difference
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See A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
2536-42.
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in the outcome of the case.100 In general, as Professor Philip Frickey
has noted, the canons of construction protect “values rooted in the
spirit of Indian treaties,” an observation that reflects an extrapolation
beyond the express language of treaties to capture the essence of the
interpretive rules established by the foundational Worcester case.101
First, the Note discusses relevant work on the “pan-Indian
superstructure,” so coined by Professor Ezra Rosser in his 2006 article
for the same journal.102 A pan-Indian approach favors homogeneity in
treaty interpretation and can lead to ad hoc decision making
detrimental to the cultural autonomy of the 574 Native nations.103 The
Supreme Court, in particular, has a reputation for using a homogenous
approach in Native treaty interpretation,104 meaning the Court does not
always afford each sovereign Nation the benefit of interpreting their
treaties with the United States in a tribe-specific manner, as opposed
to their frequent practice of making interpretive assumptions regarding
Native cultures and government structures as a group. The oft used
“homogenous approach” would not serve a Native plaintiff well if a
Bad Men claim is ever before the highest court.
In Bad Men case history, Garreaux v. United States is
particularly representative of an occasion where the Court of Claims
used a more homogenous approach to the detriment of the Native
plaintiff. The court leaned on earlier decisions in Hebah, Tsosie, and
Begay interpreting the Shoshone and Navajo treaties to distinguish the
Lakota treaty and find the “wrong” claimed by the Lakota plaintiff was
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See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 569 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
in part).
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Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 417 (2001)
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Indian treaties “is a natural extension of Chief Justice Marshall’s work in Worcester”
and reflects recognition that “the Indian treaty abrogation doctrine protects against
all but clear repeals of values rooted in the spirit of Indian treaties”).
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See A Bad Man is Hard to Find, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
2538-40; see also Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and the Academic: The Dangerous
Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 141, 142 (2006).
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One of the original articles raising this issue was Robert N. Clinton, Reservation
Specificity and Indian Adjudication: An Essay on the Importance of Limited
Contextualism in Indian Law, 8 HAMLINE L. REV 543, 589 (1985). See also Philip P.
Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 459 (2005).
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Indian tribes as wholly fungible.” Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89
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not an “affirmative criminal act.”105 This is troubling because the
Shoshone, Navajo, and Lakota have vastly different cultures, religions,
and government structures—a point missed entirely when the court
defined a “wrong” against a Lakota plaintiff based upon how it
previously interpreted Navajo and Shoshone treaties. This
homogenous approach entirely avoids the necessary work of building
out from a knowledge base of what a “wrong” would have meant to
the Lakota, and the Lakota alone, at the time of treaty signing. Most
recently, the Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes court applied the same
criminal wrongdoing standard from Jones,106 even though the treaty at
issue in Jones concerned the Ute Tribe and Cheyenne concerns the
Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes which are not parties to the Treaty with
the Ute.107
The one-size-fits-all solution of the pan-Indian interpretive
approach can only lead to detrimental outcomes for Native plaintiffs
bringing Bad Men claims. Viewing treaty terms as homogenous across
treaties could be especially detrimental when a court is interpreting a
portion of the Bad Men clause for the first time, as would be the case
with a court seeking to interpret a “wrong” to “property” in the case of
harm to Native sacred sites and waters. If a court were to determine,
for instance, that under the Treaty with the Ute the Ute signatories did
not intend for “property” to include waters or sacred sites, and then, in
a separate case, apply this same finding to the Treaty of Fort Laramie,
it would effectively deny a plaintiff with treaty rights under the Treaty
of Fort Laramie the benefit of construing the clause in accordance with
their own tribe’s worldview and customs. The same could be said of
the interpretation of the “wrong” standard in the context of harms
caused by the extraction industry: at the time of signing, “different
tribes faced different bad men engaged in (potentially) different
wrongs.”108
To combat this harmful type of judicial interpretation, the HLR
Note proposes what is essentially a necessary splintering of the Bad
Men legal doctrine and a fact-intensive inquiry into the culture and
custom of each individual Native nation.109 “Splintering” the doctrine
will primarily represent a return to a more Indigenous view of treatymaking (a nation-to-nation, not nation-to-all-nations relationship), and
will encourage courts to follow the canons of construction issued in
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Worcester that bend toward the tribe’s view of the text.110 This
framework could be highly beneficial to Native plaintiffs in the context
of harms caused by extractive industries. When examining issues such
as (1) how far to extend liability under the clause for wrongs of
corporate actors, (2) what qualifies as a sufficient “nexus” to onreservation activity, and (3) what a “wrong” to “property” might
encompass, this new judicial framework could be crucial in building a
record which takes a broad view of what Native signatories might have
envisioned for their Native nation in securing the treaty right.
Some of the possible criticisms of this new judicial framework
include judicial hardship,111 decreased scholarly productivity,112 and a
costly discovery process. Courts would likely be reluctant about this
prospect as it is much easier to cite to precedent than to do a deep
analysis into a detailed issue of federal Indian law such as a particular
tribe’s understanding of whether or not a sacred site is “property,” as
that word is included in a Bad Men clause. It is foreseeable that
adopting a fact-intensive approach will lead to a less efficient
discovery phase. Each party would have to give the historical record
the time it deserves to develop arguments which are soundly built on
the canons of construction. This could take a long time, but such a
record for each Native nation could be beneficial moving forward.
The Bad Men litigation process could aid in producing a
historical record which could be of use in future assertions of treaty
rights and which would benefit those arguing on behalf of Native
nations and the U.S. government alike. Possible criticisms of the
proposed judicial interpretation framework ultimately do not outweigh
the benefit of returning to a more Native-centric view of treatymaking
and treaty provisions. A return to Nation-specific interpretation would
be vital for plaintiffs to see success on a Bad Men claim for wrongs
resulting from resource extraction in the Mni Wiconi age. The next
section of this comment discusses what a claim of that nature might
look like.
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The Unexplored Territory of Wrongs on Property and
the Lakota Invocation Against TC Energy
Ask anyone in this camp and they will tell you the same
thing. All the prophecies end here.113

All of the Bad Men cases thus far have involved depravations
against Native persons, but it is crucial to recognize the clause also
addresses wrongs against Native property. The 2016 protest of the
Dakota Access Pipeline at the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation
ushered in a new era of Indigenous resistance to the destruction of
Native lands and waters. The increase of extraction sites near
reservations—particularly in the west—is not only concerning because
of destruction to Native sacred sites and pollution of valuable water
resources, but also because of the rise in cases of Missing and
Murdered Indigenous Women (“MMIW”) near these sites. There is an
acute need for alternative means of accountability for the extraction
industry for causing these catastrophic harms. This section begins with
an overview of the Standing Rock litigation and the Lakota invocation
of the Bad Men clause against TC Energy over the Keystone XL
pipeline. Next, this section explores how a treaty and tribe-specific
interpretation of the Bad Men clause may be an avenue for addressing
wrongs caused by extractive industries in the areas of disruption of
Native religious practice, damage to Native sacred sites, and sexual
violence against Native women.
A. Treaty Rights Post-Standing Rock and the Lakota
Invocation of the Bad Men Clause Against TC Energy
Current legal frameworks are insufficient to resolve recent
disputes over harm to Native lands. Beginning in August of 2016,
thousands descended on the Sacred Stone and Oceti Sakowin114 camps
113
Ben Mali Macfadyen, The Mythos We Live By: The Black Snake and the Row of
Flags, DARK MOUNTAIN PROJECT (March 17, 2017) (recalling the words of
“Dorothy,” an Oglala Sioux elder, in which she described the cultural significance
of Standing Rock), https://www.resilience.org/stories/2017-03-17/mythos-live-theblack-snake-row-flags/.
114
“The Seven Council Fires [Oceti Sakowin] are composed of the Dakota-, Lakota, and Nakota-speaking peoples. The Council Fires are formed from four that are
[Santee] Dakota—Sissetonwan, Wahpetonwan, Wahpekute, and Mdewakantonwan;
two that are Nakota—Ihanktonwan (Yankton) and Ihanktowana (Little Yankton);
and one that is Lakota—Tetonwan.” Angelique Towsend EagleWoman
(Wamdi A. WasteWin), U.S.–Dakota War of 1862: Wintertime for the SissetonWahpeton Oyate: Over One Hundred Fifty Years of Human Rights Violations by the
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on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota to protest the
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) across and under
ancestral Lakota lands.115 For ten months, demonstrators, Indigenous
and non-Indigenous alike, protested DAPL under the Lakota call of
Mni Wiconi—“Water is Life.”116 This call came to symbolize more
than a battle cry for protestors at Standing Rock: it grew into a symbol
of “prefigurative politics” for a new era of environmental protest
looking to Indigenous values for answers.117
Concurrent with the “#NoDAPL” movement, in July of 2016,
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (SRST) brought an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the
Army Corps of Engineers for permitting DAPL activities in violation
of the National Historic Preservation Act’s consultation
requirements.118 In September of 2016, the court denied the Tribe’s
motion to enjoin the pipeline’s construction, finding “the Tribes were
unlikely to prevail on their NHPA claims that the construction process
desecrated sacred lands adjoining Lake Oahe.”119 Although Standing
Rock’s National Historic Preservation Act and Religious Freedom
Restoration Act claims were unsuccessful, in 2017, the court remanded
the Tribe’s National Environmental Protection Act claims to the Corps
concerning “(1) whether the project’s effects were likely to be ‘highly
controversial’; (2) the impact of a hypothetical oil spill on the Tribe’s
fishing and hunting rights; and the (3) environmental-justice effects of
the project.”120
Despite persistent protest, and these legal challenges, the
Trump administration approved the pipeline to cross ancestral Lakota

United States and the Need for a Reconciliation Involving International Indigenous
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waters, and it became operational in May of 2017.121 In March 2020,
U.S. District Court Judge James. E. Boasberg considered summary
judgment motions filed by Plaintiffs Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,
Oglala Sioux Tribe, and Yankton Sioux Tribe, as well as PlaintiffIntervenor Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and ordered that the Corps
must prepare an environmental impact statement addressing the
“health, safety, and treaty concerns of the Dakota Access Pipeline.”122
This process will allow stakeholders, including tribes and Indigenous
nonprofit organizations, to submit comments on health and safety
concerns, but the pipeline’s future remains uncertain. One positive
outcome of the pending litigation is that in an accompanying
memorandum opinion in July of 2020, Judge Boasberg ordered the
pipeline to be emptied during the remand process due to the
“seriousness of the Corps’ deficiencies.”123
Though these recent wins in the U.S. District Court, District of
Columbia are significant for Indigenous communities, looking
forward, a new legal framework is needed in the Mni Wiconi age which
can address the grievances issued by the “#NoDAPL” movement as
well as the broad spectrum of harms extractive industries can cause to
tribes and individual citizens with respect to spiritual practice, water
resources, and sexual violence. Treaty rights can serve as a potent
mechanism of justice for Indigenous communities in this pursuit. In
Environmental Justice and Tribal Sovereignty: Lessons from Standing
Rock, Mary Kathryn Nagle posits that the initial failure of the SRST
filings (challenging the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to grant
the pipeline permits) to gain any traction in federal court is
representative of the larger issue of the failure of the environmental
law framework to protect Native lands and water from irreparable
harm.124 Nagle argues that, post-Standing Rock, a new framework is
needed to protect land and sacred sites—a framework cognizant of
both inherent Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous stewardship over
the natural resources which has existed “since time immemorial.”125
The Standing Rock filings and the “#NoDAPL” protest diverge in a
critical way: the tribe sought an injunction on the basis of its interest
121
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in preserving the sacred sites, whereas the protesters protested the very
existence of the pipeline.126
The Lower Brule Lakota Sioux Tribe of South Dakota believes
the Treaty of Fort Laramie is the way for tribes of the Oceti Sakowin
(Great Sioux Nation) to recover for the harms that tar sands pipeline
companies have caused their ancestral lands. In response to alleged
unethical business practices by tar sands pipeline company TC Energy,
Acting Chairman of the Lower Brule Tribe Kevin Wright stated in a
2015 press release that his people were invoking the Bad Men clause
in observance of the 124th anniversary of the Treaty of Fort
Laramie.127 In the press release dated April 29, 2015, the Chairman
declared, “We see them as ‘Bad Men’ as defined by our treaties with
the United States government. We feel that TransCanada (these bad
men) needs to be removed from our aboriginal and treaty territory.”128
Curiously, this invocation occurred a year prior to the beginning of the
protests at Standing Rock. While the Lower Brule never filed any Bad
Men claims against TC Energy or the United States, other Lakota
Nations continued to use provisions of the Treaty of Fort Laramie to
fight the tar sands company and the Trump administration, as seen in
the Standing Rock litigation.129
2019 filings by the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and the Fort Belknap
Indian Community against the Trump administration and TC Energy
alleged the Keystone XL pipeline will cause irreparable harm to
Lakota lands. The Keystone XL Pipeline is a proposed addition to the
Keystone Pipeline which would carry tar sands oil from Canada across
the Great Plains to Nebraska.130 This route would take the pipeline
through both sovereign and treaty lands of Oceti Sakowin nations.131
The plaintiffs made the tribes’ rights under the Treaty of Fort Laramie
the center of their argument.132 Plaintiffs Rosebud Sioux Tribe and
Fort Belknap Indian Community alleged that TC Energy did not obtain
the consent required by treaty to cross Rosebud territory,133 and their
First Amended Complaint specifically referenced Article 17 of the
126
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Treaty of Fort Laramie as having “the effect of . . . creat[ing] a new
process—the ‘Bad Men Clause’ process—to compensate tribes for
damages claims, and to repeal the old damages provision.”134
Ultimately, the Tribes argued the United States ignored its treaty
obligations to protect Rosebud and Fort Belknap in approving the
Keystone XL pipeline and the tribes suffered “procedural harm” as a
result.135
On October 16, 2020 Judge Brian M. Morris of the United
States District Court for the District of Montana granted defendant and
defendant-intervenors’ motion for summary judgment in part, finding
that the plaintiff Tribes failed in part to meet the preliminary injunction
standard by showing irreparable injury as a result of the permits and
that the presidential permit did not violate treaty mineral and
jurisdictional rights.136 The Court did not elaborate on the Tribes’
treaty claims, remarking briefly that “[t]he 2019 Permit does not
authorize pipeline construction across tribal land, however, and so
Plaintiffs’ mineral and treaty claims fail.”137 In the Rosebud case,
while treaty claims were at the forefront of the Tribes’ filings, the Bad
Men clause (though referenced in the Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint)
was not litigated or explored in relation to the pipeline company’s
presence on treaty lands and impact on surrounding natural resources
and communities.
The Lower Brule invocation and the Plaintiffs’ filings in
Rosebud Sioux v. Trump illustrate the creative legal horizons which
Native nations, particularly in the Bakken region,138 have turned to in
order to fight pipeline companies in the courts.139 Standing Rock has
produced an Indigenous population which is both newly awakened to
the harms of pipelines on their lands and newly interested in the power
of treaties to combat those harms. Significantly, the 1868 Treaty of
Fort Laramie formed the basis for the Standing Rock Tribe’s assertion
of express rights over the lands affected by pipeline—the same treaty
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which contains the Bad Men clause.140 There is a need for a legal
framework that looks to treaty rights in order to address the multitude
of harms arising out of extractive projects like DAPL.141 If existing
environmental law statutory frameworks such as the National
Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act
fail to hold pipeline companies accountable, the Bad Men clause—
with its compensation and extradition provisions—may be a suitable
alternative for some Native nations to redress the variety of harms
which result from extraction on and near tribal lands in the Mni Wiconi
age. This warrants a deeper dive into how successful Bad Men claims
might be in three key areas related to the impact of extraction
industries on Native resources and people: disruption of Native
religious practices, pollution and damage to sacred waters, and sexual
violence against Native women.
B. Bad Men Who Pollute and Disrupt Native Spiritual
Practice on Traditional Waters
At first glance, there may appear to be a disconnect between
the subject matter of earlier Bad Men claims (violence against Native
women, abuse of Native children, police brutality) and the Lakota
invocation against a pipeline company. But, when examined through a
fact-intensive inquiry of traditional Lakota customs and religious
practices, it is plain the Lakota have never distinguished between harm
to Native peoples and harm to Native lands. The Indigenous view of
“property” diverges significantly from the Anglo-American
interpretation of the term. First Nations scholar Julian Brave NoiseCat
notes, “For indigenous people, land and water are regarded as sacred,
living relatives, ancestors, places of origin or any combination of the
above.”142 The Lakota invocation of the Bad Men clause against a
pipeline company for wrongs on property does not signal a significant
divergence in the Bad Men jurisprudence, but instead marks a
wholistic, culturally-consistent view of treaty rights.
At the time Chief Red Cloud “washed his hands with the dust
of the floor” and signed the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie,143 he would
have known the ancient Lakota prophecy of the black snake.
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According to the prophecy, there would be a black snake which would
one day slither above the land and then move underground, destroying
sacred sites, poisoning sacred waters, and ultimately, destroying the
earth itself.144 When Native protestors, the Lakota population in
particular, convened at Standing Rock in 2016, a common sentiment
emerged—the pipeline protest era is the era in which the Lakota must
combat the black snake.145
Despite the existence of strong Lakota religious practices in
and along the waters of the Missouri River, in the Standing Rock
litigation, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe had no success in arguing
that the Army Corps’ approval of DAPL violated Lakota religious
freedom rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).146 The Tribe argued that the spiritual contamination of “the
only ritually pure water available for Lakota ceremonies” would
effectively prohibit the practice of their religion.147 The Court did not
agree, finding that under Free Exercise Clause case law (the standard
which the Court applied to the Tribes’ RFRA claim), the government’s
action in granting an easement to Dakota Access had “an incidental, if
serious, impact on a tribe’s ability to practice its religion because of
spiritual desecration of a sacred site” which did not “likely violate
RFRA.”148 As scholarship has noted, the court’s decision is in line with
how many courts have construed Native religious practice claims; in
fact, these claims often fail where courts have “consistently
misrecognized claims to collective religious obligations and duties
advanced by tribes themselves and flattened them into mere practices
of an interiorized, subjective, and individual spiritual fulfillment—
spiritual, not religious.”149
Though RFRA and Free Exercise claims have not had great
success, it is possible that individual and collective Native groups
144
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could see some success in bringing a Bad Men claim against the
government for approving a corporation’s pipeline which disrupts
Native religious practice (or perhaps an action based on the activities
of the corporation itself), but it may be a difficult pursuit. First, as
previously discussed, the most recent jurist to review a Bad Men claim
in the Court of Federal Claims held that the clause provides a cause of
action only to “individuals, not tribal governments.”150 Based upon
this holding, a tribal government is not likely to be successful in
bringing a Bad Men claim on behalf of its Nation for disruption to
collective religious practice caused by a pipeline running through or
near sacred waters. Still, this aspect of the holding alone would not
prevent individuals or groups of individuals from bringing a claim
based upon the treaty right.
Second, an action based upon significant harm to religious
practice might not satisfy the “wrong” requirement imposed by courts
that have reviewed Bad Men claims. Indigenous plaintiffs might have
a couple of different avenues to argue “wrong” to waters based on
religious practice. One route would be to argue that a “wrong” under
the clause has been committed via harm to the practitioner, that is, the
presence of the pipeline has harmed the individual by blocking access
to religious practice on spiritually pure waters. Based upon the Court
of Federal Claims’ rulings in Jones, Hernandez, and Cheyenne &
Arapaho Tribes, it is unlikely a court would find this type of wrong to
be cognizable on a motion to dismiss. In Cheyenne, the court upheld
the “prosecutable as a criminal wrongdoing” standard from Jones, a
standard which would be very difficult to satisfy based upon a “wrong”
centered on a corporate actor’s frustration of religious practice.151
Another route would be to frame the “wrong” as a wrong to
property, that the pipeline disrupts the water as an irreplaceable
religious artifact. This type of claim would be frustrated by the fact
that Native sacred sites have long been disrespected as compared to
their Anglo-Saxon religious counterparts. In 2019, when the Notre
Dame Cathedral in Paris was partially destroyed in a fire, Indigenous
activists expressed frustration that the outpouring of grief displayed by
those around the world at the destruction of the famed Cathedral was
nowhere to be found when Native sacred sites were desecrated by
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extractive industries.152 It is not just predominantly non-Native public
perception which contributes to the undervaluing of Native sacred sites
like the Missouri River; the undervaluing is written directly into the
law itself. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, the Supreme Court ruled the construction of a proposed
road over an area of significant religious importance to Native
practitioners did not violate the First Amendment because practitioners
would, in the Court’s opinion, not be forced to violate their beliefs or
be denied equal rights even though an Environmental Impact Study
revealed the construction would be severe and irreparable.153
A Bad Men claim based upon a “wrong” to a sacred site as
“property,” might more readily satisfy the “wrong” requirement
because a court has never interpreted the standard of “wrong” for harm
to property under the clause. We know from prior decisions the
standard for a “wrong” against a person is likely to be action that rises
to the criminal level. It is unclear that this same threshold would apply
to a “wrong” against property. Certainly, a plaintiff would have an
argument that under the canons of construction, a criminal standard
should not be read into the clause where it is not explicitly agreed to
in the treaty. Where this type of claim could face difficulty is in
satisfying the “property” threshold to begin with. Although under the
canons of construction treaties should be liberally construed in favor
of what the Native signatories would have understood at the time,
Native plaintiffs would still likely face difficulty in convincing a court
that sacred sites (such as certain sites along the Missouri River) not
held in trust for the tribe are in fact to be considered “property” under
the clause. Plaintiffs could argue in response that at the time a treaty
was signed those sites were considered the sacred lands of the tribe,
and still are today under the tribe’s view of “property.” Still, no court
has ever directly interpreted the meaning of “property” under the Bad
Men clause, so it uncertain how a court might view this type of claim.
Lastly, the “nexus” requirement, that the “wrong” committed
by the “bad man” must either occur on-reservation or begin onreservation and continue off-reservation, discussed at length by the
Jones court,154 could also frustrate a claim based upon harm to sacred
property and contamination of sacred water. In Cheyenne, the court
was entirely unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ “economic proximity”
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argument.155 A claim based upon frustration to religious practice
which must occur at a specific site, off-reservation, would likely face
similar opposition to the Cheyenne plaintiffs’ claim that offreservation Opioid Bad Men caused harm to those consuming opioids
on-reservation. Still, a claim that on-reservation waters are polluted as
a result of extraction, and that these waters—polluted by “bad men”—
affect the health and welfare of the plaintiffs, could be an example of
a tighter nexus to on-reservation harm. This could perhaps be
strengthened by an argument that on-reservation government officials
knowingly permitted the polluted water to flow through water
resources to the detriment of Native plaintiffs.
All requirements of the Bad Men clause considered, it is
unclear if a claim by a Native plaintiff, or group of Native individuals,
based on a “wrong” to traditional waters as property, or to the plaintiffs
themselves through frustration of religious practice, would be
successful in the Court of Federal Claims. The court’s prior decisions
indicate that all aspects of the claim will be closely scrutinized, and
that a liberal interpretation of aspects such as “property,” “wrong,” and
a connection to on-reservation harm is not guaranteed. Plaintiffs could
benefit from the simple fact that a court has yet to weigh-in on what
“property” encompasses under the clause, and the Indigenous view of
property has always been more expansive, but whether “property”
would be interpreted broadly enough by a court to include lands not
held in trust is doubtful. In this instance, Native plaintiffs could argue
for a Native-centric judicial interpretation, in line with the canon of
construction, to bolster their arguments that harm to Native sacred sites
and waters is indeed within the scope of the clause.
C. Bad Men Who Perpetrate Sexual Violence Against
Native Women Near Extraction Sites
Just as the Native fight against wrongs done to sacred sites by
Bad Men in the extraction industry has come to the forefront in the
Mni Wiconi age, so too has the Native struggle against Bad Men who
commit violence against Native women. Since it first began
transporting oil, the Dakota Access Pipeline has increased oil
extraction and production in the Bakken region by around 40%.156 The
advent of numerous “man camps” near extraction sites, concurrent
with the increase in extraction in the Bakken Region, has contributed
significantly to violence against Native women in the region, a
155

Id. at *24.
Dakota Access Pipeline Facts, ENERGY TRANSFER LP, https://daplpipelinefact
s.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
156

BAD MEN AMONG THE WHITES CLAIMS

68

TRIBAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21

problem which the United States itself has even acknowledged.157
Although the 2013 passage of the Violence Against Women Act saw
the return of limited tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian
offenders who harm Native women, tribes still have no jurisdiction
over strangers who assault Native women on Native lands.158 As a
result, non-Indian offenders are often never held accountable for their
acts of violence on Native lands.
In 2019, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) released
a study which examined the rise in numbers of oil workers in the
Bakken region alongside the rates of violent victimization known to
law enforcement.159 The study found Native Americans experienced a
24% increase in their rate of violent victimization during this time
period, with an overall increase of 47% across all races in “serious
stranger violence—murder, rape, sexual assault, aggravated assault,
and robbery.”160 These grim statistics are not shocking considering the
careless hiring practices of pipeline companies which “allow for rapid
intake of laborers during extraction booms.”161
The link between harm to Native lands and harm to Native
women has never been tenuous. This is the holistic, indigenous context
in which the wrongs referred to in the Bad Men clause are to be
understood. In the Lakota tradition, for example, there are not sharp
boundaries between human life—women—and all other forms,
animate and inanimate, in the universe: “all relations” refers to
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humans, lands, and waters alike.162 Further, there are similarities
between the acts of “bad” offenders who commit violence on Native
individuals, and the acts of “bad” corporate actors. As Professor Sarah
Deer and Dean Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner note, “Indeed, many of
the most devastating extractive projects that have damaged mother
earth are couched in the same tactics used by sexual predators.”163
Many Native women who are harmed at the hands of nonIndian offenders near “man camps” may be similarly situated to
Lavetta Elk. Elk successfully litigated a Bad Men claim and received
compensation from the United States for the violence perpetrated
against her by an army recruiter where all other criminal and civil
actions against the offender failed.164 A Bad Men claim based upon a
“wrong” by a “bad man” (who could be an employee or contractor of
a pipeline company) has the potential to see greater success than a
claim based upon a wrong to sacred property or sacred religious
practice because of Elk’s success. To be sure, this type of claim may
still face the hurdle of the “nexus” requirement if the harm did not
occur or begin on-reservation. This could be an issue for crimes against
Native women which occur in border towns.
Where this type of claim diverges from Lavetta Elk’s
successfully litigated claim is that in Elk the harm was waged by a
government actor, in that case, an army recruiter.165 We know from
Richards that it is not required that the “bad man” be a government
actor,166 but Jones instructs that a plaintiff must identify “particular
‘bad men.’”167 In Cheyenne, the court expressed skepticism, and
declined to discuss in depth arguments that corporate entities have
personhood for the purposes of the clause.168 Based upon these
holdings, it could be easier for a Native plaintiff to identify a particular
employee or contractor of a pipeline company who has committed a
wrong against a Native woman for the purposes of a Bad Men claim
than it would be to identify bad corporate actors, who have, for
example, engaged in reckless hiring practices leading to a rise in
violence by man-camp workers. Still, a court has never had this
particular type of claim before it, and if the treaty provision is to be
162
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given a liberal interpretation, and be construed in the plaintiff’s favor,
then a claim against corporate actors for the crimes of a worker they
recklessly hired is not entirely out of the question.
A claim based upon a “wrong” of a particular bad man is also
likely to fare better on a motion to dismiss with respect to the threshold
requirements of a cognizable “wrong.” Certainly, violence against a
Native woman is more likely to meet a criminal standard than
frustration of religious practice. It is unclear whether or not an
underlying criminal harm would satisfy “wrong” or if the criminal
activity must extend to a corporate “bad man” who may be only
tangentially responsible for the violence. All things considered, this
type of Bad Men claim presents a promising route for Native plaintiffs
to see some remedy (where all others have failed) for violence
committed against them by “bad men” in the extraction industry.
Because this type of claim has never been heard before, there are
several unknowns as to how a court might view a claim against
corporate actors for recklessly hiring a “bad man” who then committed
violence on-reservation. Again, Native plaintiffs could use a Nation
nation-specific interpretive framework to their advantage, alongside
the canons of construction, in arguing before a court that the clause is
indeed broad enough to encompass this type of claim.
Harm to Native sacred waters, frustration of Native religious
practice, and violence against Native women near oil-rich regions are
some of the most pressing issues facing Native Nations in the
Mni Wiconi age. The “bad men among the whites” clause, found in
nine treaties signed with Native Nations, can serve as an additional
framework in addressing these difficult issues.
IV.

Conclusion

This comment explores how a nuanced and holistic approach
to interpreting and invoking the “bad men among the whites” clause
found in nine treaties signed between the United States and Native
nations might aid Native plaintiffs in bringing a Bad Men claim for
wrongs committed as a result of extraction on and near Native lands.
Though over a century and a half has passed since the Great Peace
Commission first signed a treaty containing a Bad Men clause with a
Native nation, the passage of time has not rendered the clause obsolete.
Native plaintiffs have litigated Bad Men claims in federal courts for
over fifty years, with more recent cases showing a trend toward stricter
requirements for showing a “wrong” and nexus to on-reservation
activity under the clause.
In the era of pipeline construction and increased sexual
violence near extraction site “man camps,” the Bad Men clause is an
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increasingly vital avenue for Native plaintiffs to explore an alternative
remedy for the wrongs committed against Native persons and property.
Though Native populations grieve over what was lost due to broken
treaty promises, and grieve because of “joy that was denied our
ancestors and, for that matter, the world,”169 the treaty rights
themselves remain to this day. The best way for plaintiffs to
successfully recover under the clause is for courts to apply a treaty
interpretation approach which rejects a pan-Indian superstructure, and
instead favors a nuanced, Nation-specific approach built from the
canons of construction. Though Native plaintiffs are likely to face
significant hurdles if bringing a claim based upon harm to Native
sacred sites and waters, and frustration of religious practice, there is
reason to be optimistic that the clause could be used to address
“wrongs” such as the increase in sexual violence against Native
women in extraction-heavy regions. Ultimately, interpreting the Bad
Men clause in a Native nation-specific way will move toward better
judicial understanding of the nine Great Peace Commission treaties
and honor the culture and custom of the Native Nations who have
persisted in fighting wrongs against their people and lands from time
immemorial to present.
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